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Abstract
Macro models generally assume away heterogeneous welfare in assessing policies. We investi-
gate here within two aggregative models  one with a representative agent, the other a long-used
forecasting model of the UK  whether allowing for di¤erences in welfare functions (specically
between those in continuous employment and those with frequent unemployment spells) alters the
rankings of monetary policies. We nd that it does but that a set of policies (money supply targeting
implemented by money supply control) can be found that are robust in the sense of avoiding very
poor outcomes for either of the two groups.
Keywords: Robustness, heterogenous welfare, money supply rules, interest rate setting, price
level targeting
JEL codes: E52
We are grateful for useful comments to Sylvester Ei¢ nger and other participants at the Bank of Finland and CEPR
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1 Introduction
In this paper we ask whether the choice of monetary regimes a¤ects the balance of volatility across
consumption and employment; our reason for doing so is to investigate whether business cycle volatility
carries rather larger and more diverse costs than are usually captured in the welfare of a representative
agent. To build up the ction of this representative agent, it is usually assumed that there is perfect
pooling across agents of all shock e¤ects (Lewis, 2003a,b) In particular, unemploymentis achieved by
a lottery, so that some people are allocated leisure but perfect compensation across agents ensures that
they are no better or worse o¤ than the others who work. Yet this contradicts the basic facts of the
labour market and the impact of business cycles on households.
We would argue that the key feature perhaps of a macro economy is the di¤erence in situation between
the unemployed and the employed. In a highly exible labour market, unemployment will purely consist
of people spending short amounts of search time between jobs; in such a case it seems reasonable to
assume that those unemployed are essentially no di¤erent from the employed  unemployment is an
occasional state all, or most, experience. Here the pooling assumption is quite appropriate.
However most, maybe all, economies have not so exible a labour market: various forms of social
intervention ensure that a signicant number of unemployed remain so for a long period because the
jobs they can nd are less rewarding than their unemployment package. Such unemployed will be on
the margin of unemployment benets and employment and hence will tend to be relatively unskilled
(in benet systems, the majority, where benet/earnings replacement ratios rise markedly as one moves
down the wage distribution). It is natural in such economies therefore to group the adult working
population into those relatively unskilled for whom the risk of long-term unemployment is substantial
and the rest. The labour economics literature has adopted the terms outsiderand insiderrespectively
for these two groups: we will generally use unskilledand skilledinstead, indicating the overlap with
income distribution di¤erences.
It follows that unemployment variation will impact most heavily on the former groups, whereas
consumption variation will impact most heavily on the latter. Thus the typical representative agent
welfare function will tend to underestimate the costs of the business cycle to the former group. We
treat the welfare of the second group as dependent only on consumption, that of the rst only on
unemployment. (We will also show averages of the two groupswelfare; but these have no status as
welfare measures unless we are willing to give the two groups weights based on some political or other
ranking).
A full treatment of heterogeneity would involve separating households into two diverse sets of agents
with di¤erent constraints and behaviour (for examples of models where heterogeneity is embedded in
the structure, see Storesletten et al, 2004 and Heathcote, 2005). Such a treatment, while undoubtedly
correct in principle, involves a huge investment in complexity for the macro model itself; we doubt
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in fact whether the likely di¤erence in behaviour of the main macro functions which go to determine
overall business cycle behaviour, justies such an investment. Aggregate behaviour could be quite robust
to heterogeneity between employed and unemployed; after all the latter predominate hugely over the
former. It is surely in their welfare function evaluation of business cycle developments that we should
see big di¤erences. These evaluations are recursive to the model determining the business cycle  or so
the above argument would suggest.
There is a further practical reason for investigating these di¤erent evaluations within an aggregative
model. Among well-developed models, whether calibrated or in the empirical domain (as e.g. forecasting
models), we only have aggregative models available.
We would argue therefore that there is a case for investigating the di¤erential e¤ects on welfare
of business cycle variation before we can get around to building models of the economy with explicit
attention to the e¤ects of heterogenity. We look below at measures of di¤erential impact and argue that
they are of some importance in assessing the robustness of di¤erent monetary policies. One might then
argue, armed with such prima facie evidence, that the e¤ort of building heterogeneity into the model
itself would be justied. It is in this spirit of inquiry that we investigate the e¤ects of heterogeneity in
welfare using available models which ignore such heterogeneity in their business cycle determination.
We will be evaluating monetary regimes on the assumption that they produce the same mean behav-
iour in response to shocks; hence di¤erences between them purely concern higher moments, of which we
only examine the variance (using 2nd order Taylor series expansions). Our method will be to compare
welfare rankings of monetary regimes for the unskilled and the skilled. If rankings are di¤erent, we will
conclude that heterogeneity matters and attempt some assessment of how much and whether robustness
can be achieved towards it.
Much analysis of monetary policy assumes either a lack of indexation altogether or a xed inexation
scheme such a lagged indexing. Yet Minford et al (2003) showed that the reaction of indexation to
monetary policy is important in determining what type is optimal. In particular it argued that monetary
policy targeting nominal levels of variables (such as prices or money) could be superior to those targeting
rates of change of those variables (ination or money supply growth). For analysing this issue they
developed a model in which indexation was endogenous, chosen to optimise their welfare by skilled
agents who were assumed to be continuously employed. This model is well suited to considering the
issue here; in that paper the welfare measure used was a weighted average of the two groupswelfare 
here we use the heterogeneous measures.
That model can be considered as a calibrated macro model with a moderate degree of nominal rigidity
(from overlapping contracts) related to the extent of indexation. The resulting model is close to the New
Classicalend of the modelling spectrum. However, to test the robustness of this stylisation, we also look
at an estimated forecasting model of the same general type, the Liverpool Model of the UK (Minford,
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1980). It would be interesting to know how far the results we obtain would generalise to other models
with nominal rigidity and endogenous indexation; but we (and as far as we know others) have been
unanble so far to do this work and so it must await future research.
The monetary regimes we consider are:
1. various sorts of (exact) targets for expected (one-period-ahead) outcomes. Each is implemented via
setting the expected money supply for the coming period; the actual money supply is subsequently
delivered with an independent stochastic error (a trembling handwhich can be interpreted in
various ways  e.g. a banking system supply error or an error in current-period setting of a supply
instrument such as bank reserves). The targets we consider are for: ination, money supply growth,
the price level and the money supply level. A burgeoning literature has grown up (a partial list is:
Bank of Canada, 1994; Berg and Jonung, 1999; Casares, 2002; Duguay, 1994; Fischer, 1994; Hall,
1984; Kiley, 1998; Nessen and Vestin, 2000; Smets, 2000; Svensson, 1999a and b; Vestin, 2000; and
Williams, 1999) around the issue of whether prices or ination (money or its growth rate) should
be targeted; under level targeting the level is stationary, under rate of change targeting the level is
non-stationary.
2. alternative ways of organising current-period responses to shocks. Specically, we consider a rigor-
ous interest-rate-control regime where an interest rate target is chosen for the coming period and
then exactly adhered to; against a money-supply-control regime as above where the money error
is random. This is often referred to as the issue of operating procedure; in a quarterly model
this is not quite exact but it is helpful. The issue was rst addressed by Poole; and since then
there have been a large number of papers assuming that it is interest rates that are controlled by
central banks, for example in the manner of the Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rules (Henderson and
McKibbin, 1993; Taylor, 1993). Our reason for reopening this old issue is simply that it acquires
a new dimension when indexation is endogenous and also when there are two sets of agents.
1.1 The Models used
Our two models both assume:
1. competitive markets in labour and output
2. overlapping wage contracts, with a variable indexation parameter chosen optimally by workers;
however a marginal labour supply is always provided to the auction market at an auction supply
price.
3. Cobb-Douglas production functions.
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4. Monetary policy is implemented via money supply feedback rules (i.e. with the expected money
supply being set for the next period in response to current information; actual money supply is
then determined by the impact of shocks under the assumed operating procedure, initially taken to
be that of money-supply-control). However this assumption is a convenience only; the same rules
could be expressed as a feedback from current information to expected future interest rates, with
actual interest rates being determined by shocks, again under the assumed operating procedure.
Therefore both models share the familiar labour supply curve (based on a combination of contracted
and free labour) and labour demand curve (based on marginal labour productivity); and the aggregate
supply curve (from production function and employment) interacts with an aggregate demand curve
(from the interplay of money markets, LM curve, and an IS curve).
Two key di¤erences should be mentioned. The calibrated model (henceforth CM) does not allow
consumers to access the credit markets; the reason is to create a strong incentive to smooth consumption
via the wage contract. The Liverpool Model (henceforth LPM) is an open economy model  here
using oating exchange rates  so that, in addition to the relationships already mentioned, it embodies
e¢ cient international bond markets (which imply the uncovered interest parity condition, forcing the
real interest rate di¤erential into equality with expected real exchange rate change  a constant can
also be added for the risk-premium arising from model covariances but this does not a¤ect simulation
properties) and a current account equation related to home and world output and the real exchange
rate. LPM also assumes that inows of foreign capital occur exibly in response to investment needs so
that the production function treats the capital stock as endogenous. Hence it can be seen that the two
models di¤er in detail and in the extent of theoretical abstraction rather than in basic approach.
LPM is in essence a less restricted, open economy, version of CM. It is a rational expectations IS-LM
model, such as can be derived from a micro-founded model by suitable approximations (McCallum and
Nelson, 1999)  thus for example in LPM the IS curve has the expectation of future output in it, the
hallmark of this approximation. The models Phillips or Supply curve assumes overlapping wage contracts
as in CM. The labour market underpinning it is explicit and the model solves for equilibrium or natural
rates of output, unemployment and relative prices. Thus from a theoretical viewpoint the model could
be considered reasonably protected against Lucas (1976) critique. From the empirical viewpoint, we
have found the models parameters to be rather stable. In recent work a new FIML algorithm developed
in Cardi¤ University (Minford and Webb, 2005) has been used to re-estimate the model parameters:
it turns out that the new estimates are little di¤erent from the models original ones, based partly on
single-equation estimates, partly on calibration from simulation properties. In terms of forecasting tests,
as we discuss next, the model has performed fairly well across a variety of regime changes, not merely
on the monetary but also on the supply side of the economy.
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LPM has been used in forecasting continuously since 1979, and is now one of only two in that category.
The other is the NIESR model, which however has been frequently changed in that 20-year period: the
only changes in LPM were the introduction of the explicit natural rate supply-side equations in the
early 1980s and the shift from annual data to a quarterly version in the mid-1980s. In an exhaustive
comparative test of forecasting ability over the 1980s, Andrews et al (1996) showed that out of three
models extant in that decade  LPM, NIESR, and LBS  the forecasting performance of none of them
could rejectthat of the others in non-nested tests, suggesting that LPM during this period was, though
a newcomer, at least no worse than the major models of that time. For 1990s forecasts no formal test is
available, but forecasting with the LBS model stopped and in annual forecasting post-mortem contests
the NIESR came top in two years, LPM in three. Thus we would suggest that LPM has a respectable
forecasting record, at least on a par with the only other model available of the general type we seek
 viz. micro-founded and suitably estimated. Comparative work on the NIESR model would also be
of interest; so far it has not been possible. There are also models in the public sector  those of the
Treasury and the Bank of England  but they are not easily accessible as yet with the required back-up
of micro-foundations and forecasting record.
Lastly, in respect of simulation properties and use of these for policy analysis, we note that LPM has
been extensively used in policy analysis in support of the monetaristand supply-sidereforms of the
1980s and 1990s. which are generally considered to have been broadly successful. We therefore suggest
that the LPM could be regarded as a suitable vehicle for checking the realismof the policy conclusions
we will initially derive from CM.
In order to clarify the two models structures we list each of them below opposite the categories
already used:
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Equation category CM equation nos1 LPM equation nos2
Labour supply/wage contract A1, A4, A5 B8
Labour demand A7 B5
Production function, cost equations A3 B9
IS curve A6 B14
Investment A2 B22, B6
Consumption (=Mt 1=pt via no-credit constraint) B7
Other none B1, B19
Money Demand and supply A10, A9, A8 B4, exog money
supply eq, B11, B12, B13
Open economy: n.a.
Capital Account (UIP) B10
Current account B2, B3
1Full listing in Appendix A
2Full listing in Appendix B
2 Targeting within a calibrated model (CM):
The CM model can be organised most simply in terms of aggregate supply (shifted by the productivity
shock, ) and aggregate demand (shifted by the money supply shock, m). Monetary targeting then
moves planned next periods m so as to produce the target price or money in that period; however the
actual m is then delivered with a random error. The models behaviour in response to the two shocks
is standard. The key innovation in the model is the nding that from societys viewpoint reducing
indexation improves the economys stability in the face of supply shocks because it both attens the AS
(Phillips Curve) and steepens the AD curve, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. The indexation response
depends in turn on the persistence of the two shocks(Minford et al, 2003): this is in contrast to the usual
Fischer-Gray result which depends on the size of the shock variances. The reason persistence matters is
that indexation is spent with a delay (from the cash-in-advance lag); hence in the presence of temporary
shocks to prices it does not pay to index wages because the shock e¤ect on consumption only lasts one
period and indexation will produce extra consumption in the following period, which adds to the overall
variance of consumption. On the other hand if shocks persist, the indexation payment will o¤set the
e¤ects on consumption that persist beyond the rst period; hence indexation becomes desirable. Rising
indexation steepens the Phillips Curve in a well-known way, in that price surprises now clearly will induce
(after period 1) less of an e¤ect on real wages and hence on employment and output. It also attens
the Aggregate Demand Curve because the greater responsiveness of wages to prices implies that, given
the xed available money supply (which is required by employers and the government to pay the bill for
7
wages and unemployment benets), rising prices induces a greater reduction in employment.
P
Employment
AD  (Low Indexation) [mt]
AD  (High
Indexation)
AS  (Low
Indexation)[f t]
AS  (High Indexation)
A
B
Figure 1: The e¤ect of reduced indexation on slopes of AS and AD curves [t = productivity shock;
mt = monetary shock]
The resulting intersections for a supply shock as shown at A (high indexation) and B (low indexation).
Thus the drop in indexation is stabilising to both employment and prices in the face of a supply shock.
Of course for a money (demand) shock the result is greater employment instability, though probably less
price instability; however money is a policy-controlled variable and if the policy error in setting it can
be kept within limits then supply shocks will matter most.
Though the focus in this paper is on the separate welfares of our two groups, it is useful in the
discussion to refer also to aggregate measures; for example when both groups gain it is helpful to measure
by how much on average  arbitrary as that average of course must be, it is like an index. For this
purpose we use two measures. The rst, Welfare #1, is the standard measure used in representative
agent models, the Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function with Cobb-Douglas preferences across
consumption and leisure:
Ut =
1X
=t
 t

(c [+ a ]
1 )1    1
1  

where
ct =
W t 1
pt
(1  at 1); = 1
implying that leisure time is equal to working time when unemployment at is zero. We set v = 0:7,
based on the marginal valuation of leisure at wages net of unemployment benet. Because households
get unemployment benet on their spells of eligible unemployment, at, this implies that their choice is
distorted; they choose leisure (l, which we in practice set at unity, is the ineligible part of leisure) in
response to the di¤erential between wages and benets. But then of course they must pay for the benet
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burden via taxes; the present discounted value of this tax burden is the same as this benet bill and so
we deduct this from their consumption to obtain total private utility.
The second measure, Welfare #2, is simply the inverse of a weighted average of the two variances, of
consumption and unemployment, with similar weights, 0.7 for consumption and 0.3 for unemployment.
We examine the relative merits of various forms of monetary targeting. The main current targeting
choice of central banks is ination targeting; we therefore make this the benchmark regime against which
to measure alternatives. The rst with which we compare it is price-level targeting. A target rule
chooses a money supply for next period that forces the expected ination, or price-level respectively, to
be on target in this next period; this money supply plan is however executed with an error, the models
monetary shock(which can in practice be interpreted as a shock on either the supply or demand side of
the money market; it is the models demand shock). There is thus no current response of money supply
to shocks; nor any implied interest rate smoothing in the current period  we defer such issues to the
next section.
Our results can be summarised simply. Ination-targeting generates a high degree of indexation.
When price-level targeting is undertaken but indexation is assumed constant, welfare falls, because the
variability of unemployment rises sharply. But when indexation is allowed to change endogenously, it
drops to nil and the result is a rise in welfare, with the variance of consumption down markedly and that
of unemployment down substantially.
Table 1: Price-level and ination targeting in CM
standard error in parenthesis+
Ination-target = 100 Indexation Welfare Var Var
(%) #1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Ination-targeting 71 100 100 100 100
(3) (3) (3)
Price-level targeting 71 98 96 99 119
(holding indexation xed)
Price-level targeting 0 102 125 96 69
(indexation endogenous)
+standard error of Montecarlo sample variance = est. variance 
q 
2
n

where n
is the number of sample observations (here 2000)  source Wallis, 1995
Denition: #1 is the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average
(weight on consumption, of employed = 0:7, on unemployment = 1:0;the latter weight includes .
the e¤ect of unemployment on consumption) of the two (inverted) variances
 signicant at 10% level; signicant at 1% level
What we notice in Table 1 comparing ination and price-level targeting is that both variances fall as
we move to price-level targeting, once allowance is made for the endogenous response of indexation. This
response eliminates indexation which means that the Phillips Curve attens causing unemployment to
respond little to the current productivity shock.
However, it is worth noticing that if indexation for some reason does not respond, then there is a
marked di¤erence in the two variances: unemployment variance shoots up while consumption variance
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falls on the move to price targeting (naturally as real wages are smoother with the price level being held
to its expected trajectory). Hence what we see from Table 1 that CMs properties are very much in
line with the usual views of macroeconomists under the usual assumption that indexation is constant:
viz. that targeting the price level would destabilise employment and output, even if the stability of
prices would indeed yield benets to those with long term, nominal, or partly nominal, contracts, as here
exemplied by workers with wage contracts that are not fully indexed. (The details of how CM generates
this result are unravelled to a reasonable extent in Appendix C, using a simplied linear version of CM).
Of course the endogenous response of indexation should occur; but it could take some time to occur
(especially if the shift of regime is not at all clearly communicated). What we are seeing here therefore is a
potential conict of interest between the skilled and unskilled groups. The skilled welcome price targeting
because it smooths consumption; the unskilled do not because it worsens employment variability.
Table 2: Money-level and Money-growth targeting in CM
standard error in parenthesis+
Ination-target = 100 Indexation Welfare Var Var
(%) #1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Moneygrowth-targeting 71 100 100 100 100
(=ination targeting (3) (3) (3)
in this model)
Money-level targeting 71 100.6 102.8 102 94
(holding indexation xed)
Money-level targeting 37 104 135 100 56
(indexation endogenous)
+standard error of Montecarlo sample variance = est. variance 
q 
2
n

where n
is the number of sample observations (here 2000)  source Wallis, 1995
Denition: #1 is the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average
(weight on consumption, of employed = 0:7, on unemployment = 1:0;the latter weight includes .
the e¤ect of unemployment on consumption) of the two (inverted) variances
 signicant at 5% level; signicant at 1% level
Money targeting is not helpful to real wage smoothing; the reason is that unlike price level targeting
it does not remove the persistent e¤ect on prices (and so on real wages) of the productivity shock (in
fact when indexation remains xed it slightly increases the e¤ect of productivity persistence on the real
wage). But it does reduce the variance of unemployment even when there is no response of indexation.
The reason is that the persistence in the money supply shock is eliminated and hence the aggregate
demand curve is less variable. As indexation falls and the Phillips Curve attens this e¤ect becomes
more important. Also the e¤ect of productivity shocks is dampened on both employment and prices.
Hence the additional move to lower indexation makes the money-level rule more stabilising, just as it
did with the price-level rule.
If we look at the two policies from the viewpoint of average welfare, then we nd that money targeting
is superior before indexation has adjusted  conrming the majority macroeconomist viewpoint that
price targeting is too rigid in driving prices back to their target track. Money targeting however is
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exible enough to deliver some benet overall compared with ination targeting; it slightly destabilises
consumption but markedly stabilises employment. After indexation has adjusted, it turns out that the
two policies deliver rather similar improvements in general welfare.
But we also need to compare money with price level targeting from the viewpoint of di¤erent agents.
First, we see that under conditions where indexation has not yet changed, money targeting is preferred by
unskilled workers, whereas price targeting is preferred by skilled workers. Second, even once indexation
has changed, money targeting is still preferred by the unskilled, while price targeting is still preferred by
the skilled. The fact that money targeting is better liked by those most vulnerable to the economic cycle
underlines its compromise statusbetween pure price stabilisation and pure employment stabilisation;
in line with this it induces the elimination of only half the indexation we start o¤ with under ination
targeting.
3 Targeting within the Liverpool forecasting model of the UK
(LPM)
As part of our robustness check, we now turn to LPM. Our method is as with CM to run our monetary
rules in LPM under stochastic simulation. We shock the full range of endogenous and exogenous errors,
exactly as in the model specication. We adopt the same expressions to evaluate welfare, the only
di¤erence being that in LPM we use non-durable consumption in place of total consumption, since LPM
has no measure of the latter (in it durable consumption is included with other investment). The models
wage equation is written in terms of the real wage reacting to the real benet rate and to unemployment,
which are the auction wage components (implicitly the auction wage element has a weight of 0.2),
and negatively to the di¤erence of the price level from the average forecast of it at the times of wage
contracting, then positively to this di¤erence lagged.
For our purposes here we adapt it as follows:
Wt = vPt + wEt jPt + (Pt) + w : : : = (+ v)(Pt   Et jPt) + Et jPt + w : : :
Now we lag the auction and indexed elements two periods because of a delay due to the rms internal
checking procedures in adjusting pay to the unexpected change in the price level and obtain the real
wage as:
Wt   Pt =  (Pt   Et jPt) + (+ v)(Pt 2   Et j 2Pt 2) + w : : :
Hence the two-period-lagged term carries the extent of real wage protection. It is this part that is
adjusted endogenously by the employed to minimise the variance of their real wage.
The results within LPM are about as favourable to price-level targeting as in the representative-agent
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model. Again, Table 3 shows that under ination-targeting there is a high degree of indexation and that
this would drop to nil under price-level targeting. Similarly, too, they show that if indexation is assumed
endogenous, welfare will rise signicantly if price-level targeting is introduced; in LPM the variance of
consumption falls more and that of unemployment falls less than in the representative agent model but
both fall signicantly.
However there is a crucial di¤erence: when indexation is held xed, the variances behave very much
the same in LPM as when indexation is endogenous. There is still a substantial gain over ination
targeting, revealing that the mechanisms at work cannot be the ones in CM, whereby the Aggregate
Demand and Supply Curvesslopes are changed by indexation.
The rst reason appears to be that the great improvement in stability both for consumption and
unemployment between rows 1 and 2 comes about because price-level targeting greatly reduces the vari-
ability of private wealth ( it reduces the variance of wealth by 8%, regardless of the degree of indexation):
price-level targeting makes the real price of bonds more stable because it makes the variability of the
price level so much smaller (thus future bond prices are set in nominal terms by the nominal rate of
interest which in turn depends on the real rate plus the expected rate of ination; but future real bond
prices are additionally dependent on the future price level). In LPM private wealth has strong demand
e¤ects on private consumption and investment; thus dampening its variability dampens an important
demand shock. We can demonstrate this by redoing the stochastic simulations without wealth e¤ects;
we nd that under price level targeting with the same 80% indexation as ination targeting the variance
of consumption is 10.2% higher than under ination targeting and the variance of unemployment 6.2%
higher, very much in line with the familiar macroeconomistsintuition that having to reverse ination
shocks subsequently to hit a price level target is destabilising to the economy. In LPM this intuition is
overridden by the destabilising wealth e¤ects of prices, which price level targeting reduces.
Second, the indexation mechanism in LPM does indeed work (a little) to dampen the e¤ects of supply
shocks which are the main source of shocks in LPM; thus if we simulate the price-level target regime
with 80% indexation and then again with zero indexation for supply shocks only, we nd that the zero
indexation reduces the variance of consumption by 2% and that of unemployment by 1%. But this
plainly is not a powerful e¤ect. (For demand shocks too the move to indexation is slightly favourable 
comparing zero with 80% indexation there is no di¤erence for consumption variance and a 2.5% reduction
in unemployment variance. But within LPM, demand shocks also have a supplyelement because via
the exchange rate e¤ect they enter the Phillips Curve so the sharp distinction of CM is not present.)
Thus in e¤ect indexation as such (the di¤erence between rows 2 and 3 for Table 3) has very little e¤ect
within LPM  conrming that LPM is a model very much at the New Classicalend of the spectrum,
that is with little e¤ect of nominal rigidity. It does however have powerful wealth e¤ects (notably of
government bonds), thus it is highly non-Ricardian, that is it does not exhibit Ricardian equivalence
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under which a bond-nanced tax cut would raise savings by the tax cut, leaving consumption unchanged.
In sum what the Liverpool Model shows pre-eminently is the importance of wealth shocks to demand
and the way in which price-level targeting helps to make the economy more stable by dampening these.
Table 3: Ination and price-level targeting in LPM
standard error in parenthesis+
Ination-target = 100 Indexation Welfare Var Var
(%) #1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Ination-targeting 80 100 100 100 100
(1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
Price-level targeting 80 102:3 119 81 90
(holding indexation xed)
Price-level targeting 0 102:4 120 81 89
(indexation endogenous)
+standard error of Montecarlo sample variance = est. variance 
q 
2
n

where n
is the number of sample observations (here 12078)  source Wallis, 1995
Denition: #1 is the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average
(weight on consumption, incl. unemployeds = 0:7, on unemployment = 0:3)
of the two (inverted) variances.
 signicant at 5% level
 signicant at 1% level
When we turn to a comparison of money targeting with price targeting, (Table 4) we nd that money
targeting relatively stabilises nominal and real interest rates, real investment and total wealth, but it
relatively destabilises prices and ination and hence the real value of nancial wealth (nominal bonds).
The variance of unemployment and output rise as we switch from price- to money-targeting while that
of consumption falls. The key to these di¤erences lies in the behaviour of the expected future price level
which in an IS/LM framework enters the IS curve in terms of its percentage di¤erence from the current
price level. Under price-level targeting expected future prices do not move whereas under money-level
targeting they are positively correlated with current prices because any permanent supply shock will
continue to a¤ect prices in the same direction in the next period. Hence under money-targeting expected
ination varies less which disturbs the IS curve less. This reduced IS variability under money-targeting
implies less interest rate variability, real and nominal too; and also less variability in the real capital
stock. However, this also leads to a reduction in real exchange rate variability via uncovered interest
parity; this means less dampening of net trade volume variability (consider a rise in world trade, the
main such source of variance; under money-level targeting, it shifts IS less rightwards, generating less of
a rise in real interest rates and so in the real exchange rate which would counteract the rise in net trade).
Thus of the three exogenous sources of output demand variability, consumptions and investments fall
because of reduced interest rate and wealth volatility but net trades goes up by more, as does thus also
output and employment volatility rise.
Aggregate welfare under price- and money-targeting are roughly the same. However when we turn to
the welfare of the two groups, we nd that under LPM the preference ordering of both between price and
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money level targeting is reversed compared with CM: now the employed/skilled prefer money targeting
while the unemployed/unskilled prefer price targeting.
Table 4: Price- and money-targeting in LPM
standard error in parenthesis+
Ination-target = 100 Indexation Welfare Var Var
(%) #1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Price-level-targeting 0 102:4 120 81 89
(indexation endogenous)
Money-level-targeting 40 102:7 122 68 97
(indexation endogenous)
+standard error of Montecarlo sample variance = est. variance 
q 
2
n

where n
is the number of sample observations (here 12078)  source Wallis, 1995
Denition: #1 is the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average
(weight on consumption, incl. unemployeds = 0:7, on unemployment = 0:3)
of the two (inverted) variances.
 signicant at 5% level signicant at 1% level
Contrasting LPM with CM, we nd that the major role of wealth e¤ects in LPM, entirely absent in
CM, gives a rather di¤erent perspective on monetary rules. In LPM the endogeneity of wage contracting
is of little importance; even if it does change one transmission mechanism, it is minor in its overall
impact on variances. Instead we nd that the key source of macro variability is the variability in
nominal variables, themselves primarily controlled by monetary policy; when monetary policy increases
the stability of these nominal variables, the macro economy too is less variable.
4 Should interest rates or the money supply be controlled as
the operating instrument?
We come last to a well-worn issue of monetary policy  whether monetary policy should control (i.e.
keep xed) interest rates in the very short run, operating, period (of say a month ahead) or should
control the money supply. The seminal work of Poole (1970) noted that the answer depended, within the
IS/LM model, on the relative variances of the IS and LM shock. The issue is how stable the Aggregate
Demand curve can be kept in response to the nuisanceshocks in the IS and LM curves. Instability in
the AD curve will spill over into prices and output and so into the welfare function used here.
We can analyse both CM and LPM in these terms. Notice that because the IS curve responds
to (Etpt+1   pt) it potentially matters which targeting regime is being followed: thus under ination
targeting (Etpt+1   pt) will not move whereas under price-level targeting Etpt+1 will not move so that
(Etpt+1  pt) moves by the full amount of  pt. Under money-level targeting (Etpt+1  pt) moves by less
than this amount because Etpt+1 will vary directly with but less than pt. So each targeting regime must
be considered separately.
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Figure 2: The Poole set-up illustrated for CM under ination-targeting; MSC= money supply control,
IRC= interest rate control.
4.1 Interest-rate-control within CM
Within CM, an important feature is a very at IS curve. This can be seen from the large size of the
parameter on the real interest rate in equation A2 (for the capital stock). In linearised form this equation
(see Appendix C) is:
Kt = 1:11

k(1  )(1  To)
r0

(dt  

rt
ro

(A2)
The relevant parameter is therefore  1:11
n
k(1 )(1 To)
r0
on
[ 1ro ]
o
Notice the denominator is ( 1r0 )
2
which is a very large number owing to the small size of r, the real interest rate, whose units are fractions
per period. Now note that rt = Rt   (Etpt+1   pt).
Under the ination targeting regime, which we consider rst, (Etpt+1   pt) is kept at the target
level by the monetary rule. This implies that xing nominal interest rates, Rt, will also x real interest
rates, rt. Also movements in the price level will not shift the IS curve. Thus the Aggregate Demand
Curve will slope vertically under ination targeting.and interest-rate control (IRC). Figure 2 illustrates
CM under ination targeting. However under money supply control (MSC) the AD curve will slope
normally because the LM curve will react to prices. Finally we note that the IS curve is shifted in CM
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by productivity shocks in a real business cycle manner, since investment reacts sharply to productivity
prospects.
IRC implies that IS curve shocks are una¤ected by movements in prices because these are o¤set by
equal movements in future prices; nevertheless the IS curve is so at that only a very small interest rate
change is produced and thus e¤ectively the IS barely shifts at given interest rates; thus shifts in the AD
curve are very small. By contrast with MSC the LM curve shifts with random movements in money
supply which introduces larger shocks to the economy. In Poolean terms, here shocks to the money
supply dominate IS shocks in their impact on the economy. Table 5 below shows IRC or MSC under CM
with ination targeting
Table 5: IRC or MSC under CM with ination targeting
standard error in parenthesis+
Index: Money = 100 Indxtn Welfare Var Var
#1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Money Supply Control, MSC 71 100 100 100 100
(3) (3) (3)
Interest Rate Control, IRC 71 101.5 107.4 96 91
+standard error of Montecarlo sample variance = est. variance 
q 
2
n

where n
is the number of sample observations (here 2000)  source Wallis, 1995
Denition: #1 is the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average
(weight on consumption, of employed = 0:7, on unemployment = 1:0;the latter weight includes .
the e¤ect of unemployment on consumption) of the two (inverted) variances
 signicant at 5% level; signicant at 1% level
Table 6: IRC or MSC under RAM with price-level targeting
standard error in parenthesis+
Index: Money = 100 Indxtn Welfare Var Var
#1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Money Supply Control, MSC 92 100 100 100 100
(3) (3) (3)
Interest Rate Control, IRC 92 100.1 97 98 107
+standard error of Montecarlo sample variance = est. variance 
q 
2
n

where n
is the number of sample observations (here 2000)  source Wallis, 1995
Denition: #1 is the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average
(weight on consumption, of employed = 0:7, on unemployment = 1:0;the latter weight includes .
the e¤ect of unemployment on consumption) of the two (inverted) variances
 signicant at 5% level; signicant at 1% level
When the monetary rule is a price-level one, Etpt+1 is now xed; thus any movement in pt represents
an equal movement in the real interest rate with a very large e¤ect shifting the IS curve. Thus the AD
curve here is very at mirroring this e¤ect of prices on the IS curve. Now IS curve shocks, combined
with a at AS curve because of zero indexation, will produce large swings in output but prices will be
heavily stabilised (as they must be to keep the real, and so the nominal, interest rate constant). Hence
IS shocks dominate in the Poole sense. Table 6 above reveals that the variance of unemployment rises
markedly while price variability falls, stabilising the real wage and so consumption. Overall welfare is
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Table 7: IRC or MSC under CM with money-level targeting
standard error in parenthesis+
Index: Money = 100 Indxtn Welfare Var Var
#1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Money Supply Control, MSC 37 100 100 100 100
(3) (3) (3)
Interest Rate Control, IRC 78 99.3 68 95 182
+standard error of Montecarlo sample variance = est. variance 
q 
2
n

where n
is the number of sample observations (here 2000)  source Wallis, 1995
Denition: #1 is the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average
(weight on consumption, of employed = 0:7, on unemployment = 1:0;the latter weight includes .
the e¤ect of unemployment on consumption) of the two (inverted) variances
 signicant at 5% level; signicant at 1% level
reduced, as is that of the unskilled while that of the skilled rises.
Essentially the same occurs under money-level targeting  Table 7. The main di¤erence from price-
level targeting is that now expected future prices only change with productivity shocks; under IRC money
shocks have no e¤ect and so only productivity shocks matter. These, being entirely permanent, induce
far greater persistence in prices and so far greater indexation, which in turn sharply increases the e¤ect
of productivity shocks on output and employment..
Summarising, we could say that interest rate control also controls prices more. This is good for the
skilled, smoothing their real wages. But it destabilises employment and output, which is bad for the
unskilled.on the margins of the labour market.
4.2 Interest rate control in LPM
The interpretation of LPM results in Poolean terms is similar, except that it has a more standard IS
curve with a much more modest interest-rate elasticity, simply because it does not have the erce real
business cycle reaction of CM but rather a looser stock-adjustment reaction of the investment to demand
and monetary conditions. Hence LPM is less sensitive to whether the monetary rule is for ination
or price-level targeting. Within LPM IS shocks have a higher variance than LM shocks (remembering
the model uses the monetary base rather than any wider denition of money, because of the concern
with nancial deregulation). It follows in the standard manner of Poole that there will be greater AD
instability which will also show up in greater instability of output and prices (and so of both real wages
and nancial wealth). However the model tends to stabilise consumption since price and output rises
are positively correlated; thus a rise in output lowers nancial wealth, with the e¤ects of the latter on
consumption more than o¤setting those of output. This is the pattern that shows up in the simulations
of Interest Rate Control below; unemployment, output and price variability all rise but consumption
variability falls.
The one exception to this is the case of money-supply-targeting, where LM shocks have a higher
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variance than IS shocks. In this case when the money supply is controlledany independent growth
rate of the money supply above its target rate is immediately followed by a growth rate below the target
by an equal amount; this variability appears to dominate that from the IS shocks. Hence here output
and unemployment are more variable under Money Supply Control, while consumption is less variable
because of the same mechanism as above.
Table 8: Interest rates or money setting in LPM
standard error in parenthesis+ LPM under ination targeting
Index: Money = 100 Index Welfare Var Var
#1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Money Supply Setting 80 100 100 100 100
(1:3) (1:3) (1:3)
Interest Rate setting 80 100.8 100.3 97 106
standard error in parenthesis+ LPM under price-level targeting
Index: MSSetting = 100 Index Welfare Var Var
#1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Money Supply Setting 0 100 100 100 100
(1:3) (1:3) (1:3)
Interest Rate setting 0 99.8 98.8 100 104
standard error in parenthesis+ LPM under money-level targeting
Index: MSSetting = 100 Index Welfare Var Var
#1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Money Supply Setting 40 100 100 100 100
(1:3) (1:3) (1:3)
Interest Rate setting 40 95.4 93:0 112 97
+standard error of Montecarlo sample variance = est. variance 
q 
2
n

where n
is the number of sample observations (here 10824; note lesser number because some runs
would not solve under both MSC and IRC)  source Wallis, 1995 Denition: #1 is
the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average(weight on consumption,
incl. unemployeds = 0:7, on unemployment = 0:3) of the two (inverted) variances.
 signicant at 5% level signicant at 1% level
When we review the e¤ects on di¤erent groups we nd that the e¤ect on each group depends on
whether the target regime is price/ination or money-level. The employed prefer IRC under the rst but
MSC under the second, and vice versa for the unemployed. This leads nally into a discussion of how
we might use these results to guide the choice of regime.
4.3 Regime choices under robustness criteria:
In robustness studies it is often suggested that one should avoid policies that produce extreme bad
results in any model (Kilponen and Salmon, 2004). The principle  a descendant of Roys safety
rst principle  is a way of knocking out a potentially dangerous policy. In this context we are
concerned about heterogeneity both of models and of social groups. One can think of this in political
terms, from the viewpoint of a policy-maker: the two groups represent the two main sets of voters on
whom the macro economy has e¤ects; while the two models represent the possible spectrum of model
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uncertainties. One can also think of it in welfare terms as a way of seeking to satisfy a practical version
of the Pareto principle  that there should be no (serious) losers. This indicates we should look for
regimes that badly a¤ect either group under either model, using the existing regime (ination-targeting
under interest-rate-control) as the benchmark. Table 9 shows all regime/model combinations relative to
this benchmark.
It is clear that if we take the safety principle literally, we must rule out all changes of regime except
one. The price-level regime would raise the variance of unemployment sharply under CM if indexation
did not adjust or did so very slowly. Similarly money-targeting would raise it sharply under CM under
interest rate control. Ination targeting if it shifted to money supply control would do the same under
CM. This only leaves money-targeting under money supply control.
If one is willing to assume that indexation will adjust in the manner predicted by the models then
one reaches a similar result but by a di¤erent argument. Price-level targeting would then be disaster-free
under both MSC and IRC, while money targeting would be disaster-free under MSC. Deciding between
these two turns out to depend on which model one uses: under CM the employed prefer price-targeting
with IRC the unemployed money-targeting (with MSC) but under LPM the unemployed prefer price-
level targeting with MSC, the employed money-targeting (with MSC). Hence neither group has a clear
preference for either regime. One might in these circumstances take the disaster-free regime which
produces the best average welfare across both models: this (again) is money-targeting with MSC.
This regime represents in this context a compromise between price-level targeting and ination target-
ing, in that price targeting produces too stark a contrast with the existing benchmark. It also represents
a shift away from interest-rate control to money supply control; this occurs because of the switch in
targeting regime, in the sense that MSC is dangerous under ination targeting whereas IRC is dangerous
under money-targeting for reasons discussed earlier to do with the di¤erent ways expected ination is
formed.Thus we nd a back to the futureresult here: monetary policy should revert to money supply
control under a regime of targeting the path of the money supply.
Table 9: Ination-targeting under Interest-rate-control=100: comparing welfare and variances for various
combinations (gures taken from sample of 2000 for RAM and 10824 for LPM)
CM(se=3) LPM(se=1.3)
Ination P-level M-level Inatn P-level M-level
optim. indxn x indexn optim. indxn x indexn.
Total welfare:
MSC 93 117 83 125 96 100 110 124
IRC 100 114 83 93 93 100 106 115
Var Unemp
MSC 110+ 75 131+ 62 103 94 84 90
IRC 100 81 137+ 113+ 113+ 100 87 88
Var Cons:
MSC 105 100 104 105 107 103 94 77
IRC 100 98 96 99 99 100 97 86
+ denotes extreme bad variance, interpreted as 10% or more over the benchmark.
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5 Conclusions:
We looked at the operation of monetary rules both within a calibrated model and within a liveforecast-
ing model of the UK, and in both models we distinguished between the welfare of two groups of agents,
the (usually) employed and the (often) unemployed, whom we identied respectively with skilled and
unskilled workers. Our aim was to see how far allowing for such a di¤erence of interests could matter
for the choice of monetary regime. We found that it did matter, in the sense that certain model-policy
combinations could cause harm particularly to the unskilled group and therefore would prudently be
avoided either from a welfare or a political viewpoint We concluded that targeting the level of the money
supply within an operating system of money-supply-control is the dominant monetary regime. It is both
the only regime that strictly avoids a disaster to any group and it is also the one that delivers the highest
average welfare across both models and groups.
One possible limitation of our results is that we have tackled the modelling issue by retaining aggregate
functions in the models while identifying group welfare recursively  thus the groups may be di¤erently
a¤ected, but aggregate behaviour is una¤ected by this di¤erence. We argued at the beginning that this
limitation should not be a serious one; but it should in principle be investigated nevertheless.
There are of course other limitations: we have not investigated possible variations in policy (for
example our targeting has all been assumed to be strict, that is no temporary deviations are allowed
for in future plans) or in modelling issues (for example money velocity is stable, apart from the current
random error) or in models (many other models can be considered). Thus our results should be considered
as preliminary in content and methodologically illustrative.
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Appendix A The calibrated model (CM)
The model has two exogenous shocks driving it, a monetary (demand) shock, mt, to the money supply
presumed to originate from monetary policy, and a supply (productivity) shock, t. The productivity
shock is (rather naturally) modelled as a random walk throughout. Of course whether the money supply
shock is transitory or permanent depends on the monetary rule; if it targets for example the level of
money it will be transitory, if it targets the money supply growth rate, it will be turned into a random
walk The authors then asked whether the monetary regime should target the growth rate or the level
of the money supply; or of prices? They suggested that these choices appear in an unfamiliar light
when indexation is endogenous. When the monetary regime moves to a price level rule with exogenous
stationary money supply shocks, the aggregate supply curve attens (as we have seen already above
in our Phillips Curve set-up) and the aggregate demand curve steepens, generating a high degree of
macro stability (i.e. in the face of supply shocks) provided that money supply shocks themselves are
low-variance and stationary.
The representative household is assumed to be entirely liquidity-constrained; this assumption empha-
sises the importance of the contract choice, since a choice that minimises the variance of the spendable
real wage is therefore identical with one minimising the variance of the employed agents consumption.
In a more realistic model with consumption smoothing this motive would have been implemented by
including some transactions cost on smoothing, thus providing a motive for smoothing the real wage
itself; however, this involves greater complexity than the stark assumption made that the transactions
costs are in e¤ect insuperable.
The household is embedded in an environment of prot-maximizing competitive rms which on a
large proportion of their capital stock face a long lag before installation (a simple time-to-build set-up)
and a government that levies taxes and pays unemployment benets (which distort householdsleisure
decisions and introduce a social welfareelement into monetary policy). Firms and governments use the
nancial markets costlessly and settle mutual cash demands through index-linked loans; since there is no
binding cash constraint on these agents, these loans are assumed to be una¤ected by the imperfections
of the price index which are short term in nature. This model is too simplied in many ways to match
the data of a modern economy whether in trend or dynamics; however its focus is purely on the wage
contract decision and its simplicity is justied in terms of its ability to match the OECD facts about
wage contracts.
In calibrating the model the authors chose parameters perceived as plausible for modern OECD
economies. The contract length is set at 4 quarters; the elasticity of leisure supply () at 3; the share of
stocks and other short-termcapital (k) at 0.3; the average life of other capital at 20 quarters; the share
of labour income in value-added () at 0.7 (the production function is Cobb-Douglas); the elasticity of the
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o¢ cial price index to unanticipated ination (c) at 0.2 (implying that a 1% unexpected rise in ination
would result in a 0.2% temporary overstatement of the price level faced by the representative consumer).
The initial values assume 10% unemployment; a capital-output ratio of 6; an average (=marginal) tax
rate of 0.10; a real interest rate of 5%.
The government is assumed to smooth both the tax rate and the growth rate of the money supply
by borrowing (from rms). Nevertheless it cannot avoid noise in its money supply setting  the source
of this could be its inability to monitor the money supply quickly or even at all (for example in the USA
the use of dollars by foreigners around the world makes it impossible to know what the domestic issue
of dollars is).
Money supply raises prices in the long run, and in the short run also raises output, with persistence
extending up to 15 quarters but with most e¤ect over after 10. In the high-indexed case there is less real
e¤ect and less persistence than in the high-nominal case.
These fairly standard properties stem from the models deliberate drawing on elements that have
been shown by past work to be useful in explaining the business cycle and also natural rates as discussed
for example by Parkin (1998), though he notes we are still some way from building dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models that can fully explain the business cycle. The elements here include: time-to-
build investment, cash-in-advance, nominal contracting (as noted above), household liquidity constraints,
and (on the natural rate side) the inuence of unemployment benets on labour supply. With suitable
country-by-country calibration one would expect to be able to model OECD countriesbusiness cycle
and natural rate experience with at least some modest success.
Minford et al found that in the face of stationary productivity and money supply shocks indexation
would be minimal with only a slight tendency to rise as the variance of money shocks rose dramatically.
However when shocks to either became highly persistent indexation to prices or to their close competitor,
auction wages, (which together we term real wage protection) become large, becoming largest when
both shocks are persistent. The reason was that productivity shocks would disturb prices and so the
real worth of nominal wage contracts; indexation was of little use in remedying this disturbance if it was
temporary because by the time the indexation element had been spent the shock would have disappeared,
but with a permanent disturbance indexation can help o¤set it with a lag. If into this already-indexed
world of persistent productivity shocks, monetary persistence is also injected, indexation rises further, to
help alleviate the increased disturbance to real wages. This higher indexation also helps to alleviate the
instability in unemployment which accompanies the greater shock persistence of money  the point being
that this persistence induces persistence in the economys departure from its baseline and so disturbs
unemployment too for longer.
The authors looked at experience in the OECD in the 1970s where it is well-known that real wage
protection was substantial; their calibrated model, when estimated variances and persistence of money
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and productivity shocks were fed into it, predicted high protection in all countries they could cover,
apparently in line with the facts. They also found, contrary to much casual comment, that there was
little evidence of any diminution of real wage protection in the 1990s; the model also predicted as much,
for even though the variance of money supply shocks fell by then, their persistence remained essentially
unchanged.
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A1 Supply of work
at = ac  (Wt= (bt  Pt 4))   "t
A2 Demand for capital goods
Kt = (1  k)  (1  )  Et 20 [dt  (1=Rt)  (1  Tt)]+
k  (1  )  dt  (1  Tt)  (1=rt)
A3 Output function
dt = t K(1 )t  f(1  at) Ng
A4 Wage rate, solved for Wt
Wt = (1  v   w) Wt + v  Et 4 [Wt=Pt]  Pt + w  Et 4 [Wt]
A5 O¢ cial price index
ln(Pt) = ln (pt) + c  (ln (pt)  ln (Et 1 [pt]))
A6 Goods market clearing, solved for rt after substituting for Kt from Eqn.2
dt = Mt 1=pt +Kt  Kt 1
A7 Labour market clearing, solved for pt
N  (1  at) = (  dt  (1  Tt)  pt) =Wt
A8 Money market clearing, solved for Wt
Mt = NfWt  (1  at) + bt  Pt 4  atg
A9 E¢ ciency
Rt = Et [f(r)]
1=20   1 ; f(r) = 20i=1
 
1 + rt+i4

A10 Money supply
Mt = Mt +mt
A11 Government budget constraint
bgt = (Mt 1  Mt +N Bt  Pt 4  at   dt  pt  Tt) =pt +
 
1 + rt 14
  bgt 1
A12 Firms budget constraint
dt  (1  Tt) = Kt  Kt 1 +
 
Wt  (1  at) N

=pt + b
p
t 1 
 
1 + rt 14
  bpt
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Notes: 1. By Walrass Law the bond market clearing equation, bpt + b
g
t = 0, is redundant.
2. To normalise the variables dt;Kt, rt, pt and Wt to their base run values constant factors were
applied to the right-hand sides of the following equations in their solved form: A2 1.11 (multiplicative);
A3 0.629 (multiplicative); A6 +0.0135 (additive); A7 0.7 (multiplicative); A8 0.9574 (multiplicative).
A.1 Variables and coe¢ cients for CM
A.1.1 Endogenous variables : base run values
at Supply of work 0.10
Kt Demand for capital goods 6.00
dt Output function 1.00
Wt Wage rate 1.00
Pt O¢ cial price index 1.00
rt Real interest rate (fraction per annum) 0.05
pt Price level 1.00
Wt Average wage 1.00
Rt Long term real interest rate (fraction per annum) 0.05
Mt Money supply 1.00
bgt Government bonds outstanding 0.00
bpt Firmsbonds outstanding 0.00
A.1.2 Exogenous variables : base run values
Bt Benets 0.60
"t N(1:0; 0:01) 1.00
t N(1:0; 0:1) 1.00
Mt Money supply target 1.00
mt Money shock 0.00
Tt Tax rate 0.10
A.1.3 Coe¢ cients
ac = 0.46
 = 3.00
k = 0.30
 = 0.70
N = 1.00
c = 0.20
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Appendix B The Liverpool Model Listing of equations
B.1 Behavioural equations
log(EGt) = log (EGSTARt) +A39 log (Yt=Y STARt) (1)
XV OLt = A40Y STARtfA27 log(WTt) +A28 log(Yt) +A47+
A29 fESTARt + 0:6 fRXRt   ESTARtgg+
A30 fXV OLt   1= fA40Y STARt   1ggg (2)
XV ALt = XV ALt 4 + fXV OLt  XV OLt 4g+A31
f0:32Y STARtfRXRt  RXRt 4   ESTARt + ESTARt 4gg+
A32XV ALrest 1 (3)
log(M0t) = A44 +A13 log(M0t 1) +A14flog(Yt)+
log(1  TAXt 1)g+A16TRENDt +A17NRSt +A18V ATt (4)
log(Ut) = A42 +A3 log(Yt) +A4flog(RWt) + log(1:0 +BOt)+
log(1:0 + V ATt)g+A5TRENDt +A6 log(Ut 1) +A36Urest 1 (5)
log(Gt) = A45 +A19RLt +A20flog(Gt 1)  log(FINt 1)g+
A21flog(Gt 1)  log(Gt  2)g+ log(Gt 1) (6)
log(CONt) = A46 +A22RLt +A23 log(Wt) +A24QEXPt+
A25 log(CONt 1) (7)
log(RWt) = A43 +A7UNRt +A8flog(UBt) + log(1:0 + LOt)g+
A9 log(Ut) +A37 log(RWt 1) + f:095gUNRtf A10g+
A10 log(RWt 2) +A11ETAt +A12ETAt 1 (8)
RXRt = A41 + 0:000 +A1flog(RWt) + log(1:0 +BOt)g+
A53flog(Pt)  log(Pt 4)g+ f1:+A1g log(1:+ V ATt)+
A2TRENDt +A35RXRrest 1 (9)
29
B.2 Identities and calibrated relationships
RSt = fRXRt   EtRXRt+1g+RSUSt (10)
NRSt = EtINFLt+1 +RSt (11)
RLt = fRXRt   EtRXRt+20g=5:0 +RLUSt) (12)
NRLt = RLt + Et
 
5X
i=1
INFLt+i=5
!
(13)
Yt = GINVt + CONt + EGt +XV OLt  AFCt (14)
INFLt = log(MONt)  log(MONt 4)  log(M0t)
+ log(M0t 4) (15)
log(Pt) = log(Pt 4) + INFLt (16)
Wt = FINt +Gt (17)
BDEFt = EGt   2:0 TAXt  Yt + TAX0  Y0 (18)
AFCt = Ytf0:6588318fAFCt 1=Yt 1g+ 0:1966416fAFCt 3=Yt 3g+
0:1454006fAFCt 4=Yt 4g+g (19)
PSBRt = BDEFt +RDIt (20)
RDIt =  :5fNRLt 1=4:0gFINt 1fffPt=Pt 1g0:66g   1:0g+
PSBRtf:32fNRSt=4:0g+ :5fNRLt=4:0gg+
0:32fNRSt=4:gFINt 1   :32fNRSt 1=4:gFINt 1 +RDIt 1 (21)
GINVt = Gt  Gt 1 +A38Gt 1 (22)
FINt = EGt   Yt  fTAXtg+XV ALt +A54  FINt 1+
f1: A54g  fFINt 1  ffPt 1=Ptg0:66gg
f1:0  0:155  ffNRLt=NRLt 1g   1:0gg+ res_FINt +RDIt (23)
B.3 Equilibrium variables (-star):
The -star variables YSTAR, USTAR, ESTAR and WSTAR are the equilibrium values of Y, U, RXR
and RW respectively, found by solving equations 2,5,8 and 9 under the conditions that XVOL=0 and
exogenous variables maintain their current values; EGSTAR is the value of EG that would produce a
constant debt/GDP ratio with Y=YSTAR.
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B.4 Coe¢ cient values in order A156:
1.528 -0.003 -2.150 0.792 0.010 0.804 0.470 0.210 -0.018 -0.224
-0.290 0.189 0.870 0.150 0.000 -0.002 -0.349 0.839 -0.016 -0.004
0.640 -0.215 0.056 0.153 0.870 0.000 0.529 -1.205 -0.388 0.429
0.103 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.931 0.271 1.000 0.012 -0.125 0.320
0.170 25.262 0.102 -0.337 0.013 0.666 11.503 -0.016 -0.011 0.017
0.011 0.750 -0.750 0.300 -1.000 -1.000
(Exogenous variables  e = error term)
RSUSt = c+ 0:899RSUSt 1 + et
EUNRSt = c+ 0:977EUNRSt 1 + et
 logWTt = c+ et
BOt = c+ et
V ATt = c  0:286V ATt 1 + et
UNRt = c+ 0:869UNRt 1 + et
UBt = c+ et
LOt = c+ et
TAXt = c  0:365TAXt 1 + et
 logEURXRt = c+ 0:235 logEURXRt 1 + et
 logEUCPIt = c+ 0:503 logEUCPIt 1 + et
 logMONt = PEQt +MTEMt + et
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B.5 Model notation:
Endogenous Variables
Y GDP at factor cost
P Consumer Price Level
INFL Percentage growth rate of P (year-on-year)
MON Nominal Money Stock (M0)
RW Real wages (Average Earnings/Price)
U Unemployment
Q Output deviation from trend (Y/YSTAR)
AFC Adjustment to factor cost
EG real government spending on goods and services
BDEF interest-exclusive budget decit (deated by CPI)
PSBR public sector borrowing requirement (deated by CPI)
XVAL real current account of balance of payments
XVOL same, at constant terms of trade
RS(RL) real short term (log term) interest rate
NRS (NRL) nominal short term (long term) interest rate
M0 real money balances (M0)
G real private stock of durable goods, including inventories
W real private stock of wealth
FIN real private stock of nancial assets (net)
CON real private non-durable consumption
RXR real exchange rate (relative CPI, UK v. ROW)
RDI real debt interest
GINV gross private investment in durables plus stock building
Exogenous Variables
MTEM Temporary growth of money supply
PEQ Growth of money supply
BO Employers national insurance contributions
UNR Trade Unionisation rate
LO Average amount lost in taxes and national insurance
TREND Time trend
WT World Trade
TAX Overall tax rate
UB Unemployment benet rate (in constant pounds)
EUNRS Euro nominal short-term interest rates
EURXR Euro real exchange rate index
EUCPI Euro CPI
RSUS US real short-term interest rate
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Appendix C Targeting rules and their e¤ects within CM
To examine how targeting works within the CM which though small is nevertheless non-linear and not
analysable therefore in its original form (hence our use of stochastic simulations to discover its properties),
it is necessary to linearise the model and simplify it into a form where we can derive its key analytical
properties. The following lists the linearised equations (the numbering corresponds to that of the full
model of Appendix A). The numbers shown are the e¤ect of the normalising constants referred to in
Appendix A. In order the equations are: (1) marginal labour supply which reacts to the auction wage;
(2) the demand for capital; (3) the production function; (4) the actual nominal wage, a weighted average
of auction (weight of ), indexed (weight of v), and nominal.; (5) the over-reaction of the o¢ cial price
index to the true price index; (6) goods market-clearing; (7) labour market-clearing; (8) money market-
clearing.; and (9) the real spendable wage (wages are paid with a 1-period lag so the real spendable wage
is the lagged one, deated by the current price level).
at =  a0Wt (A1)
Kt = 1:11

k(1  )(1  To)
r0

(dt   [ rt
ro
]

(A2)
dt =
(1  )
K0
Kt + t  

(1  a0)at (A3)
W t = Wt + vPt (A4)
Pt = (1 + c)pt (A5)
dt = mt 1   pt +Kt  Kt 1 (A6)
at =
 [(1  To)]
0:7
(dt + pt  W t) (A7)
mt =
(1  ao)
0:96
W t  

W o
0:96
 Bo

at (A8)
W t 1   pt = Wt 1 + v(1 + c)pt 1   pt (A9)
where  = (1  v   w) ; equation numbers correspond to Appendix A.
For simplicity we have omitted all price and wage expectations from the wage-setting equation, (5);
these are all dated at t-4. Similarly from the labour supply equation, (1), we omit the 4-quarter lagged
price level which indexes unemployment benets. Hence in e¤ect the model solves in terms of the news
occurring between t-4 and t, and in the case of (9), the real wage available for spending, because wages
are paid with a 1-period lag, news between t-5 and t. The very long lag (20 quarters) terms determining
the demand for capital are similarly omitted. We now explain the models structure in terms of supply
and demand.
Equation (A9) is the implied behaviour of the employed consumers living standard, whose uncertainty
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is being minimised by the contract structure. We can progressively reduce the simultaneous block of
equations (A1)(A8) to three as follows. We can use equation (A3), the production function, and (A6),
the supply of savings from goods market clearing, while also using (A1) to eliminate at, to obtain:
dt = Z(dt  mt 1 + pt) + t +
ao
(1  ao)Wt (A10)
where Z = 1 Ko
This is the output supply made available by savings (and so capital) and by labour supply; the
rst terms in Z emerge from equation (A6) as the amount of savings (i.e. the output not devoted to
consumption which is mt   pt). Note in passing that we can solve equation (A2) for rt conditional on
dt, mt 1, and pt: since the latter determine available savings, the interest rate has to force the demand
for capital to equal this availability. Hence equation (A2) and the interest rate are in a second, recursive
block, and can therefore be ignored.
Equations (A1) and (A7), labour supply and demand, yield with (A4) and (A5), dening wages and
the price index,
Wt =
(1  To)=0:7
[(1  To)=0:7] + ao [dt + (1  v
0)pt] (A11)
where v0 = v(1 + c)
(A11) therefore species the free wages that would clear the labour market, given output and the
price level. (A10) and (A11) between them constitute the supply-side of the model, augmented to include
the market for savings (which depend on last periods money supply).
Finally, using the money market equation (A8) together with labour supply (A1) (which denes the
split between benets and wage payments) we obtain:
Wt = Q[mt   (v0(1  ao)=0:96)pt] (A12)
where
Q =
1
(1  ao)=0:96 + (W o=0:96 Bo)ao
(A12) is reminiscent of Robertsons wages fund; there is a certain stock of money available to pay
wages and benets and given the structure of contracts, it determines free (auction) wages.
The full solution is complex. However, we can represent the models main workings by reducing
equations (A10) and (A11) to a supply curvebetween free wages and the price level; and juxtapose it
with the demand curvegiven by (A12), the wages fund equation. We neglect terms in Z as of small
magnitude, which conveniently allows us to rewrite (A10) in levels form as
dt = t +
ao
(1  ao)Wt + c0
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where c0 is a constant, ignored in what follows, reecting the initial values of dt, t and Wt. In this case
the supply curve from (A10) and (A11) becomes:
Wt = V [t + (1  v0)pt] where V =
1
+ 0:7ao(1 To)  
a0
1 ao
(A13)
It follows that:
pt = (Qmt   V t) where  =
1
[Qv0(1  a0)=0:96] + V 0(1  v0) (A14)
and
Wt = lV t + (1  l)Qmt where l =
[Qv0(1  a0)=0:96]
[Qv0(1  a0)=0:96] + V 0(1  v0) (A15)
and the spendable real wage is
W t 1   pt = Wt 1 + v0pt 1   pt where  = 1  v   w (A16)
For 0 < v0 < 1 the resulting demand and supply picture is familiar. Figure 2 shows the model in
pt, Wt space; since labour supply (1   at) varies directly with the auction wage, this is also price level,
employment space (output depends also on the capital stock, but is closely related to employment, and
so this is also e¤ectively familiar price, output space.) As v0 tends to 0, DD (eq. A12) steepens and the
SS (eq. A13) attens.
We begin by considering within this model the nature of various basic monetary rules to which our
discussion of optimality will be related; we then show a monetary rule may be optimised within that
model; this discussion is conducted entirely in terms of the simplied linear model. We then consider the
performance of various forms of targeting rules within the model in terms of the same model. Finally
we use stochastic simulations of the full non-linear model to derive the accurately-calibrated optimality
results. We conclude with some policy implications.
C.1 Targeting ination and the level of money or prices  some mechanics
of Monetary rules
If we take the linearised version of our model, we nd the following solutions in general:
pt = (Qmt   V t) (C1)
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where
 =
1
Qv0(1  a0) + V (1  v0)
and
Wt = lV t + (1  l)Qmt (C2)
where
l =
Qv0(1  a0)
Qv0(1  a0) + V 0(1  v0)
Both V and Q vary inversely with the share of auction contracts,:
Q =
1
(1  ao)=0:96 + (W o=0:96 Bo)ao
V =
1
+ 0:7ao(1 To)  
a0
1 ao
Recall that Wt (the auction wage, and the shadow price of labour supply) also directly determines
employment through the labour supply function. Thus we can take it and employment as the same
subject to some linear transformation.
Real (consumed) wages are:
W t 1   pt = Wt 1 + v0pt 1   pt (C3)
Suppose that
t = t 1 + t (C4)
that is productivity follows a random walk. As we have seen, households raise their real wage protection
(of their real consumed wage), the more persistent are price level shocks. Thus if there was zero protection
( = v0 = 0) they would be wide open to the variability of pt. The more persistent the price shocks, the
higher that variability, because the shocks would cumulate.
If we now compare a money supply rule that eliminates money shock persistence with one that
eliminates price shock persistence, the rst plainly eliminates one independent source of persistence in
price shocks. Thus we would expect to nd, and do, that protection falls. The second takes the process
one stage further, eliminating all price shock persistence. Thus we should nd that protection falls further
still. (In the full non-linear model there are other sources of persistence, and these keep some incentive
to protection alive; hence it does not disappear altogether.) An ination targeting rule by contrast with
both the money and price level targeting rules ensures that prices are expected to be a random walk,
entirely persistent; and therefore in this regime indexation is high.
36
A price level rule is one that sets
0 = Etpt+1 = (QEtmt+1   V Ett+1) (C5)
and hence
Etmt+1 =
V
Q
Ett+1 =
V
Q
t (C6)
whence the price level ruleis
mt =
V
Q
t 1 + t (C7)
whereas the (pure money) rule that eliminates money shock persistence is simply
mt = t (C8)
Notice that under the price level rule money supply accommodates known past productivity shifts;
this removes persistence from price shocks, though at the cost of persistence in money shocks.
An ination-targeting rule sets
EtPt+1 = (QEtmt+1   V Ett+1) = pt = (Qmt   V t)
and hence (remembering that Ett+1 = t) :Etmt+1 = mt so that the behaviour of the money supply
becomes:
mt = mt 1 + t
When these are substituted into (C2) we obtain
(price level rule) Wt = (1  l)Qt + V (lt + [1  l]t 1) (C9)
(pure money rule) Wt = (1  l)Qt + V (lt) (C10)
(ination rule) Wt = (1  l)Q[t +mt 1] + V (lt) (C11)
and when into (C3) we obtain:
(price level rule) W t 1   pt = V [t   v0t 1]  Q[t   v0t 1]
+ V [lt 1 + t 2] + Q(1  l)t 1 (C12)
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and
(money level rule) W t 1   pt = V [t   v0t 1]  Q[t   v0t 1]
+ V [lt 1] + Q(1  l)t 1
(ination rule) W t 1   pt = V [t   v0t 1]  Q[mt   v0mt 1]
+ V [lt 1] + Q(1  l)[t 1 +mt 2] (C13)
For the nominal wage, Wt, which is directly related to employment (supply) and hence to out-
put, the stability ranking is, with indexation at a high level as optimal under ination-targeting,
(from the most stable down), money rule>ination rule>price-level rule; with indexation endogenous,
money>price>ination. For the spendable real wage (consumption), the stability ranking is, with indexa-
tion high as for ination targeting, price>ination>money; and for endogenous indexation, price>ination=money.
But in fact for spendable real wages all regimes deliver very similar stability; only for price-level targeting
with endogenous indexation is the stability gain statistically signicant.
Using the relevant equations above, and assuming that the wage contract length is 4 periods, then
under the price rule we have:
VarWt =

V
Q
2
[3 + l2]2 + [(1  l)]22 (C14)
and
Var(W t 1   pt) =

V
Q
2
[2 + (v0   l)2 + 22]2 + f[(1  l) + v0]2 + 2g2 (C15)
whereas under the money rule, mt = t, we have the following variances (all divided for presentational
convenience by Q2):
VarWt = 4

l
V
Q
2
2 + [(1  l)]22 (C16)
and
Var(W t 1   pt) =
(
2 + [v0 + (1  l)]2g2 +

V
Q
2
f2 + 3[v0   l]2g2
)
(C17)
and under the ination rule we have:
VarWt = 4

l
V
Q
2
2 + 4[(1  l)]22 (C18)
and
Var(W t 1   pt) =

V
Q
2
f()2 + 3[(1  v0)  l]2g2 + (C19)
f()2 + [(1  v0)  (1  l)]2 + 2[v0   (1  l)]2g2 (C20)
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Table 10: Table of Variances with CM as calibrated in this linearised and simplied version*:
Indexation as for ination target Indexation endogenous
VarWt (Indexation parameters: v0 = 0:5; l = 0:7)
Ination rule 100 100 (v0 = 0:5; l = 0:7)
Money rule 93 35 (v0 = 0::26; l = 0:36)
Price rule 163 165 (v0 = l = 0)
Var(W t 1   pt) (Indexation parameters: v0 = 0:5; l = 0:7)
Ination rule 100 100 (v0 = 0:5; l = 0:7)
Money rule 102 96 (v0 = 0::26; l = 0:36)
Price rule 126 82 (v0 = l = 0)
*calibration:  = 0:2 (for v0 = 0:5);= 0:15(for v0 = 0) and = 0:175
(for v0 = 0:26); = 0:1; VQ = 1:3;
2
 = 
2
 = 0:0001
While these calculations show that the simplied linear model in our calibrations is somewhat adrift
of the full model (especially with respect to the price-level rule for employment), they do show that if
indexation is xed at high ination-targeting levels the money rule is good for employment stability, while
the price rule is bad for it; and that with endogenous indexation the money rule is good for employment
stability while the price rule is good for consumption stability.
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